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The finding of Campbell et al. (2001) that idiosyncratic risk has increased
noticeably over the past 30 years is followed by a surge of work trying to offer
explanations for this phenomenon. The existing literature suggests that the increase
in idiosyncratic risk may be related to institutional holdings (Xu and Malkiel, 2003),
firm age (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003), deteriorating yet increasingly volatile earnings
(Wei and Zhang, 2006), or changes in growth options (Cao et al., 2007).
Much of the previous research investigates the phenomenon of the increase in
idiosyncratic risk within the efficient market framework, and attributes the positive
trend in idiosyncratic risk to changes in fundamental values over time. However,
existing studies of stock price movement also argue that the volatility of stock
prices is too high to be attributed to changes in values (Shiller, 1981; Roll, 1988;
Black, 1986). Evidence of excess stock price volatility over value variation suggests
that examining the increase in idiosyncratic risk based only on the efficient market
view may be insufficient, and that seeking complementary explanations based on a
behavioral finance perspective may be fruitful.
The behavioral finance perspective maintains that people are affected by
cognitive biases and considers the influence of these biases on the behavior of market
participants. One psychological bias that is often related to market volatility in the
behavioral finance literature is “overconfidence”. This bias is first discussed in the
psychological literature in the 1970s when psychologists find that people tend to
overestimate their sophistication of skills. The term “overconfidence,” is later on
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adopted in the finance field to describe the tendency of investors to overestimate the
precision of their private information.
According to the efficient market hypothesis, overconfidence, as a nonfundamen-
tal factor carrying no information, should have no influence on financial markets.
Anecdotal evidence and research in the behavioral finance literature, however, sug-
gest that overconfidence does matter in a world in which heterogeneous beliefs and
arbitrage constraints are present. Evidence has been found to support the rela-
tion between overconfidence and trading volume, price, profits, stock volatility, and
market anomalies that lack justification from traditional finance theories (Benos,
1998; Barber and Odean, 2001; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2001;
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003).
The link between overconfidence and excess stock volatility is well-established.
Daniel et al. (1998) incorporate investor overconfidence into their model by
assuming that overconfident investors use both public and private information, but
overestimate the precision of the latter. They argue that overconfidence increases
unconditional stock volatility, as overconfidence results in the initial overreaction of
investors to private signals and hence greater need for price reversals when public
signals are later revealed. The more overconfident investors are, the more the price
swings away from its true value, leading to a more severe adjustment later on and
higher stock price volatility. The relation between overconfidence and excess price
volatility predicted by Daniel et al. is consistent with the findings of Odean (1998),
3
Benos (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), and Caballe
and Sakovics (2003).
Whereas previous studies usually address the relationship between overconfi-
dence and total stock volatility, in this paper we argue that if the private information
received by overconfident investors is largely firm specific, one could expect much
of the high stock volatility resulting from overconfidence to be idiosyncratic. It is
therefore reasonable to expect overconfidence to be positively related to idiosyncratic
risk.
Furthermore, studies on the evolution of overconfidence argue that overconfident
investors can better survive in the market, as they trade aggressively and intimidate
rational or underconfident investors to trade less than optimal (Kyle and Wang
(1997)), explore the environment more actively (Bernardo and Welch (2001)),
undertake challenging tasks more often (Weinberg (2006)) and are willing to take on
more risks (Hirshleifer and Luo (2001)). These studies conclude that overconfidence
works to the advantage of investors. Therefore, overconfidence is pervasive and grows
over time, before reaching some extreme value. If overconfidence is associated with
high idiosyncratic risk and overconfidence increases as time passes by, an increase in
idiosyncratic risk over time is not surprising.
We therefore propose three hypotheses: H1) idiosyncratic risk is cross-sectionally
positively related with investor overconfidence at the individual stock level; H2)
aggregated idiosyncratic risk is positively related with investor overconfidence at
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the market level; and H3) changes in overconfidence over time contribute to the
positive time trend in aggregated idiosyncratic risk.
In our empirical work, we employ three proxies for investor overconfidence:
investor sentiment, stock turnover, and stock misvaluation.
Investor sentiment reflects changes in trading strategies that are not fully
driven by solid information about changes in fundamentals, and therefore could
largely result from investor overconfidence (Caballe and Sakovics, 2003). We adopt
the sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006), which is based on
the common variation in six underlying proxies for sentiment: the closed-end fund
discount, NYSE share turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day returns
on IPOs, the share of equity issues in total equity and debt issues, and the dividend
premium.1
Trading volume is perhaps the most widely accepted measure of overconfidence.
Overconfidence in one’s own private information and valuation of stocks promotes
heterogeneous beliefs among market participants, and increases trading. Shiller
(2000) states that overconfidence, however generated, appears to be a fundamental
factor promoting the high volume of trade. Empirical evidence has been found to
support this argument (Barber and Odean, 2001; Meir et al., 2006).
1This sentiment index is somewhat related to market conditions, which enhances our justification
for using it as an overconfidence proxy. Several studies (see, for example, Daniel et al. (1998),
Gervais and Odean (2001), and Odean (1998)) suggest that overconfidence is greater following
market gains. This intuition is based on biased self-attribution, which describes people’s tendency
to give themselves credit for their successes and to blame external factors for their failures. As
investors in equity markets generally hold long potions, bullish market conditions will add to their
overconfidence as they attribute profits to their ability to correctly choose stocks.
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We identify stock misvaluation as the third proxy for overconfidence. According
to Daniel et al.(1998), overconfident investors overreact to private information the
precision of which is overestimated, and the stock price deviates from its true value
as a result. Positive signals cause stocks to be overvalued, while negative signals
drive stock prices to be undervalued. Hence, misvaluation can capture investor
overconfidence by measuring the degree to which investors overshoot. The relation
between overconfidence and misvaluation is supported by Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003), who argue that investor overconfidence contributes to a significant bubble
component in asset prices. We follow the method of Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) to
measure misvaluation. The methodology is described in detail in section I.A.
Turnover and misvaluation measures have data at the individual stock level,
and can be aggregated to get measures at the market level. The investor sentiment
measure, however, applies to overconfidence only at the market level. Therefore, we
use turnover and misvaluation in cross-sectional regressions at the individual stock
level, and all three measures in time-series regressions at the market level.
Our empirical results support our hypotheses. We find that our overconfidence
measures are positively correlated with idiosyncratic risk, both in cross-sectional
regressions at the individual stock level, and in time-series regressions at the market
level. And after adding the three overconfidence measures, the positive time trend
in idiosyncratic risk is reduced in time-series regressions.
To examine the robustness of the relationship between overconfidence measures
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and idiosyncratic risk, we perform tests in which we control several variables
suggested in the literature that are related to the observed idiosyncratic risk time
pattern, including firm size, age, profitability and growth option. We find that our
overconfidence measures are robust in the presence of these variables. These results
imply that in addition to variations in fundamental values, changes in investor
behavior are also a determinants of idiosyncratic risk.
We also examine the time trend of overconfidence over time. All the overconfi-
dence measures we employ manifest, as does idiosyncratic risk, a significant positive
trend over the whole sample period from January 1971 to December 2005. However,
there is a significant decrease in overconfidence after 2000. Interestingly, we find
that idiosyncratic risk drops over the same period as well, a phenomenon that is
also mentioned in Brandt et al.’s (2005) study. We argue that the overlapping of the
time patterns of overconfidence and idiosyncratic risk is not coincidence. Instead,
changes in investor overconfidence over time could be one determinant of the time
pattern of idiosyncratic risk.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section I introduces the data
and methodology. Sections II and III present the results of cross-sectional and time-
series tests, respectively. Section IV discusses the evolution of overconfidence and
idiosyncratic risk over time, and section VI concludes the paper.
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I. Data and Methodology
A. Data and Methodology
The stock return data are from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP), and the accounting data are from COMPUSTAT. Our sample includes
stocks listed on the AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ. Due to data limitations, measures
that are based on COMPUSTAT data are calculated from January 1976 to December
2005. All other measures cover the period from January 1971 to December 2005. Only
stocks with available daily returns of current month and market capitalization data
at the end of the previous month are kept in the sample. All accounting data in this
paper are winsorized at both the upper and lower 2.5% levels.2
Idiosyncratic risk is calculated in two ways. In cross-sectional regressions, the
idiosyncratic risk of an individual stock is the variance of residuals from regressing
that stock’s daily returns on the Fama-French four factors within each month.3
For time-series regressions, we adopt the beta free method to calculate market-level
idiosyncratic risk, following Campbell et al. (2001), Wei and Zhang (2006), and
Cao et al. (2007).4 The daily return of an individual stock over the daily CRSP
value weighted market return is calculated, and the variance of this excess return is
calculated monthly. In month t, the variances of excess returns on available stocks
2We follow Tim et al. (2007) in choosing the 5% winsorizing level.
3The Fama-French four factors used are the market excess return factor, small-minus-big factor,
high-minus-low factor, and momentum factor.
4We have also tried to measure market-level idiosyncratic risk by value weighting the idiosyncratic
risks of individual stocks calculated under the first method. The results are qualitatively the same.
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are value weighted and multiplied by the number of trading days in the month to
get the aggregate idiosyncratic risk, Vt.
SENT⊥t denotes investor sentiment at month t. For our empirical work, we
employ the sentiment index developed by Baker and Wurgler (2006) in which the
influence of business cycles has been removed.
TOi,t is the turnover of firm i’s stock at time t. It is calculated by scaling the
trading volume of firm i’s stock in month t by its total number of shares outstanding.
TOi,t of each firm are value weighted by the market capitalization of firms at the
end of the previous month to get the aggregated measure TOt .
Return on equity, ROEi,t, is firm i’s income before extraordinary items over
its book value of equity in quarter t. Stocks with a negative book value of equity
are deleted. Earnings reporting date for individual firms are obtained from CRSP
database.5 Following Wei and Zhang (2006) and Cao et al. (2007), we match
the quarterly accounting data with monthly stock return data through earnings
reporting date. The quarterly ROEi,t data are then transformed into monthly data.
If one firm has missing monthly ROEi,t data at time t, its most recently released
return-on-equity data will be used instead.6 V ROEi,t is the variance of monthly
ROEi,t over the previous 3 years. Firm months with fewer than nine observations in
5For stocks with ROEi,t data but missing earnings reporting date, we set the reporting month to
be the third month after the fiscal quarter, following Tim et al. (2007).
6We delete observations for which the most recently released accounting information dates back to
more than six months previously, as such remote information may not accurately depict a firm’s
profitability at the current stage. Extending the period from six months to twelve months does not
qualitatively change our results.
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that period are deleted. Monthly ROEi,t and V ROEi,t are then value weighted to
get ROEt and V ROEt, respectively.
In their paper, Cao et al. (2007) employ five proxies to measure growth options
and use these proxies to explain the positive trend in idiosyncratic risk. Among these
proxies, the ratio of market value to book value has the strongest explanatory power
for the trend in idiosyncratic risk and is one of the most robust proxies throughout
the tests. However, when one allows for the possibility of asset misvaluation, this
ratio arguably contains two components. That is, letting V denote the true value of
the firm, one can write
(M/B)i,t = (M/V )i,t × (V/B)i,t, (1)
where M and B stand for the observed market value and book value, respectively.
In equation (1), with (M/V )i,t capturing misvaluation, we argue that (V/B)i,t
is the bona fide measure of firm i’s growth option at time t. Whether it is the
growth option component, the misvaluation component, or the combination of the
two that drives the results in the study of Cao et al. is an empirical issue. The
misvaluation component indeed can be greatly affected by investor overconfidence,
as discussed. For our empirical work, we follow the method of Rhodes-Kropf et al.
(2005) to separate the M/B ratio into a misvaluation component and long-term
growth component.
The decomposition methodology is as follows. First we group firms into 12
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industries based on Fama and French’s industry classification system. Then we
perform the following cross-sectional regression within each industry quarterly:




i,t + β4jtLEVi,t + ǫi,t, (2)
where i stands for an individual stock and j stands for the industry to which the
stock belongs, Mi,t is the market value per share of firm i at quarter t, Bi,t is the
corresponding book value of common equity per share, NI+i,t is the absolute value
of net income per share, I(<0)NI
+
i,t is an indicator function for negative net income
observations, and LEVi,t is a measure of the degree of leverage defined as the total
liabilities scaled by total assets.7 Observations with LEVi,t less than 0 or greater
than 1 are deleted.
For each industry j, the quarterly industry coefficients are averaged over the
whole sample period (denoted as β¯0j , β¯1j , β¯2j , β¯3j , and β¯4j , respectively) and then
applied to firms within the industry to get the estimated true value per share, Vi,t,
for each firm at each quarter:




i,t + β¯4jLEVi,t. (3)
Because over- and undervaluation tend to cancel each other out within each
7We follow Tim et al. (2007) in defining market value and book value based on COMPUSTAT
data. Mi,t and Bi,t are calculated accordingly:
Mi,t =[Total Assets (data44)-Total Common Equity (data59) + Price (data14) * Common Shares
Outstanding (data61)]/Common Shares Outstanding (data61);
Bi,t =Total Assets (data44)/ Common Shares Outstanding (data61).
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industry over a long time, Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) argue that Vi,t is a close
measure of firm i’s true value. Likewise, using Vi,t as a proxy for V , we argue
that (V/B)i,t is a cleaner measure of the growth option and is less influenced by
misvaluation. We thus use GOi,t to denote firm i’s growth option at time t:
GOi,t = (V/B)i,t. (4)
Accordingly, (M/V )i,t can be viewed as a measure of misvaluation of firm i at
time t. (M/V )i,t is greater than 1 when stock is overvalued and less than 1 when
undervalued. To account for both the under-and overvaluation component in the
subsequent analysis, we take the absolute value of the difference between (M/V )i,t
and 1 for each firm at time t as a measure of the degree of misvaluation:
MISVi,t = |(M/V )i,t − 1|. (5)
We then match the quarterly accounting data with monthly stock return data
and transform the quarterly data into monthly ones following the same methodology
we applied in handling the ROE data. The monthly (M/B)i,t, (V/B)i,t, (M/V )i,t,
MISVi,t and GOi,t measures are value weighted to get (M/B)t, (V/B)t, (M/V )t,
MISVt and GOt. The time-series variances of the monthly measures over the
previous 36 months are aggregated to get (VM/B)t, (V V/B)t, (VM/V )t, and V GOt.
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B. Summary Statistics and Time Trends
Column (2) of Table I(a) shows that aggregate idiosyncratic risk, on a whole,
increases over the period from January 1971 to December 2005, as documented in
previous work (see, for example, Campbell et al. (2001), Wei and Zhang (2006), and
Cao et al. (2007)). And we could see that there is a sharp decrease in idiosyncratic
risk in the period from year 2001 to 2005. The mean and median of idiosyncratic risk
are almost halved. This piece of evidence is consistent with Brandt et al.’s (2005)
finding. They argue that in the three years ending in 2004, idiosyncratic risk falls to
pre-1990s levels.
Panel A of Table I(b) reveals that each of the three overconfidence measures
increases over time. Panel B shows that both ROEt and V ROEt generally increase
as well.
Panel C of Table I(b) shows that (M/B)t and (VM/B)t do, on a whole, grow,
which is consistent with the findings of Cao et al. (2007). The (V/B)t ratio, which
we argue is a purer measure of the growth option, and the (M/V )t ratio manifest
time trends similar to that of the (M/B)t ratio.
[Insert Table I here]
The time trends of idiosyncratic risk and the overconfidence measures are
plotted in Figures 1 and 2, respectively. Figure 1 shows that idiosyncratic risk
fluctuates from time to time, but generally increases before 2000. It jumps sharply
in October 1987, which may be a result of the stock market crash in that period,
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and decreases after 2000. Figure 2 reveals that the three overconfidence measures
manifest similar time trend, and that the time pattern of overconfidence measures
is somewhat similar to that of the idiosyncratic risk.
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here]
We conduct preliminary tests (not reported for brevity) by regressing idiosyn-
cratic risk and the three overconfidence measures on a time trend measure t, respec-
tively. The results show that idiosyncratic risk increases significantly over time, but
decreases after year 2000. Meanwhile, all three overconfidence measures have signif-
icantly positive time trend coefficients over the whole sample period, and negative
ones in the last five years.
C. Idiosyncratic Risk, M/B Ratio, and M/B Components
Cao et al. (2007) find that idiosyncratic risk is positively correlated with both
the level and variance of the M/B ratio. In this sub-section, we examine the
relationship of idiosyncratic risk with the M/B ratio and with its two components.
This can be viewed as a re-examination of the findings of Cao et al. (2007). We
regress Vt on (M/B)t−1, (V/B)t−1, and (M/V )t−1, respectively. In each regression,
we also include their variances.
[Insert Table II here]
The results in Table II indicate that the coefficients on (M/B)t−1 and its
variance, (VM/B)t−1, are significantly positive, consistent with the findings of Cao
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et al. (2007). The regression results in rows (3) and (4) show that the explanatory
power of (M/B)t−1 is actually shared by each of its two components: the coefficients
on (V/B)t−1 and (M/V )t−1 are both significantly positive at the 1% level. However,
for the variances, whereas the coefficient on (V V/B)t−1 is significantly positive at
the 1% level, the coefficient on (VM/V )t−1 is insignificant.
The results in row (3) of Table II show that although the M/B ratio could
be contaminated by misvaluation, its V/B component, which is arguably a better
measure of the long-term growth option, is not only significant with the predicted
sign but also able to eliminate the trend in idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, we find
that the positive relation between (VM/B)t−1 and Vt is largely contributed by the
variance of the V/B ratio. In the subsequent tests, we separate the M/B ratio, and
measure growth option and misvaluation based on its two components.
II. Cross-Sectional Tests
A. Idiosyncratic Risk and Overconfidence: Cross-Sectional Tests
H1 predicts that stocks that are more subject to investor overconfidence
influence will have higher idiosyncratic risk. In this section, we perform cross-
sectional regressions to test this prediction. We add several control variables in the
regressions, including stock return, size, leverage ratio, age, stock price, ROE, and
growth options. The cross-sectional regressions are performed monthly. The mean
and standard errors of the slope coefficients are estimated across the whole sample
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period. The results are shown in Table III.8
[Insert Table III here]
The coefficient on RETi,t−1 is significantly negative. Firm size is negatively
correlated with idiosyncratic risk; that is, smaller firms tend to have higher
idiosyncratic risk. The relation between leverage and idiosyncratic risk is ambiguous,
as suggested by previous research (Campbell et al., 2001; Wei and Zhang, 2006). The
coefficient on AGEi,t is negative in column (1), consistent with Pastor and Veronesi’s
(2003) argument that younger firms with a shorter history are more likely to have
higher idiosyncratic risk. However, when more variables are controlled in subsequent
columns, the coefficient on AGEi,t sometimes turns insignificant or positive.
The coefficient on stock price, PRCi,t−1, is significantly negative, consistent with
Brandt et al.’s (2005) finding that low-priced stocks have high idiosyncratic risk.
The relation between stock price and idiosyncratic risk is robust across columns.
The coefficients on ROEi,t−1 and V ROEi,t−1 are significantly negative and positive,
respectively.
To examine the relation between idiosyncratic risk and growth option, we start
by measuring growth option using the market value to book value ratio, (M/B)i,t,
following Cao et al. (2007). In column (3), we see that the coefficients (M/B)i,t−1 and
(VM/B)i,t−1 are both significantly positive. We then replace the M/B ratio with
8In cross-sectional regressions, we only stock turnover and stock misvaluation as proxies for investor
overconfidence. The sentiment index is not examined here as it has data only at the market level.
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the GO measure in column (4), which we argue is a purer measure of growth option.
Again, the coefficients on GOi,t−1 and V GOi,t−1 are both significantly positive.
Next, we examine the performance of the overconfidence measures. Stock
turnover, TOi,t−1, and misvaluation, MISVi,t−1, are used as overconfidence proxies
in columns (5) and (6). The coefficients on both measures are significantly positive,
as predicted.
In the last four columns, all variables are pooled together. The coefficients on
SIZEi,t−1, PRCi,t−1, ROEi,t−1, and V ROEi,t−1 remain significant with predicted
signs. The coefficient on (M/B)i,t−1 becomes negative in columns (7) and (8). The
coefficient on GOi,t−1, however, remains significantly positive in columns (9) and
(10). And the coefficients on both overconfidence measures, TOi,t−1 and MISVi,t−1,
are consistently significantly positive.
B. Cross-Sectional Tests in Subsamples
Results in Table III suggest that idiosyncratic risk is higher for smaller stocks,
for younger stocks, and for lower-priced stocks. To examine the robustness of the
results, we conduct cross-sectional tests in subsamples in this section. Stocks are
divided into subgroups based size, age, or price. Results of subsample tests are
presented in Table IV.
[Insert Table IV here]
In panels A and B, stocks are partitioned based on size. Panel A uses stock
turnover, TOi,t−1, as the overconfidence proxy, while panel B uses misvaluation,
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MISVi,t−1. The coefficient on TOi,t−1 is significantly positive in all size groups. The
coefficient on MISVi,t−1 is significantly positive in the medium and large size stock
groups, but turns negative in the small stock group. The coefficients on SIZEi,t−1,
PRCi,t−1, ROEi,t−1 and V ROEi,t−1 are significant with predicted signs across rows.
The coefficient on AGEi,t is either insignificant or positive in small stocks. GOi,t−1
is positively correlated with idiosyncratic risk, but the relation between V GOi,t−1
and idiosyncratic risk is negative.
Stocks are grouped based on age in panels C and D. Both TOi,t−1 andMISVi,t−1
are significantly positively correlated with idiosyncratic risk in all age subgroups. The
relation between idiosyncratic risk and PRCi,t−1 is vague here. The explanatory
powers of ROEt−1 and V ROEi,t−1 are strong in all subgroups. The coefficient
on GOi,t−1 is significantly positive in most age subgroups, but the coefficient on
V GOi,t−1 is often insignificant or of opposite sign.
Panels E and F present results of subsample tests based stock price. The
relation between idiosyncratic risk and TOi,t−1 is robust across rows. The coefficient
on MISVi,t−1 is significantly positive at 1% level in the medium-priced and high-
priced stocks, but is negative in low-priced stocks. The coefficient on SIZEi,t−1 is
significantly negative in three out of six rows. The relation between idiosyncratic
risk and age is inconclusive. The coefficients on PRCi,t−1, ROEi,t−1, V ROEi,t−1 and
GOi,t−1 are significant with predicted signs, while the coefficient on V GOi,t−1 is
either insignificant or with erroneous sign.
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C. Cross-Sectional Tests in Subperiods
We also perform the cross-sectional regressions in each five-year-subperiod. The
results are reported in Table V. Panel A uses stock turnover as overconfidence
measure, while Panel B uses misvaluation.
[Insert Table V here]
In panel A, the coefficient on TOi,t−1 is significantly positive in five out of six
subperiods. The coefficient is insignificant in the 1991-1995 subperiod. And in panel
B, the coefficients on MISVi,t are significantly positive in all six subperiods. The
relation between idiosyncratic risk and overconfidence measures are generally robust
in subperiod tests.
For other variables, SIZEi,t−1 is consistently negatively correlated with idiosyn-
cratic risk in all subperiods; the relation between idiosyncratic risk and AGEi,t−1
and PRCi,t−1 are not quite robust; the coefficients on ROEi,t−1 and V ROEi,t−1 are
significantly negative and positive, respectively, in all subperiods; the coefficient on
GOi,t−1 is significantly positive in most subperiods, while the coefficient on V GOi,t−1
is either insignificant or negative.
The results in Tables III, IV and V suggest that overconfidence is cross-
sectionally positively correlated with idiosyncratic risk. And the relation between
idiosyncratic risk and overconfidence measures is robust when size, age, stock price,
profitability and growth options are all controlled.
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III. Time-Series Tests
In this section, we examine the relation between overconfidence and idiosyn-
cratic risk in time-series regressions.
A. Idiosyncratic Risk and Overconfidence: Time-Series Tests
To examine the relation between idiosyncratic risk and overconfidence predicted
in H2 and H3, we first estimate the following time-series regression for each of the
three overconfidence measures:
Vt = β0 + β1t+ β2OCt−1 + ǫt, (6)
where OCt−1 represents the level of the overconfidence measures at time t− 1.
[Insert Table VI here]
The regression results in Table VI show that before adding the overconfidence
measures, the time trend coefficient is significantly positive. After they are added
to regression, each of the three measures for overconfidence reduces the positive
time trend in Vt. The coefficient on t is reduced by around 40% in magnitude
after controlling for SENT⊥t−1. The coefficient on SENT
⊥
t−1 is significantly positive
with a t-value of 2.09. TOt−1 has stronger power to reduce the positive time trend
in idiosyncratic risk than SENT⊥t−1. The coefficient on t turns from significantly
positive to negative. Meanwhile, the coefficient on TOt−1 is significant at 5% level,
and the adjusted R-square more than doubles. When MISVt−1 is added, the
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coefficient on t again turns from positive to negative, and the coefficient onMISVt−1
is significant at 1% level.
In Table VI, the coefficients on SENT⊥t−1, TOt−1 and MISVt−1 are all
significantly positive, as predicted, suggesting that idiosyncratic risk is high when
investor sentiment is high, stock turnover is large, or misvaluation of stocks is severe.
All these situations correspond to a market with high level of investor overconfidence.
B. Idiosyncratic Risk, Profitability, Growth Option, and Overconfidence
Wei and Zhang (2006) and Cao et al. (2007) find that profitability and growth
options are correlated with idiosyncratic risk in time-series regressions and contribute
to its time trend. In this section, we add both profitability and growth options in
time-series tests, in addition to the overconfidence measures. The results are shown
in Table VII.
[Insert Table VII here]
Column (1) shows the result of regressing idiosyncratic risk on the time
trend measure t only: the time trend coefficient is significantly positive with a t-
value of 2.14. Columns (2), (3) and (4) add sentiment index, stock turnover, and
misvaluation, respectively. The coefficient on SENT⊥t−1 is significantly positive at
5% level, while the coefficients on TOt−1 and MISVt−1 are significant at 1% level.
The level and variance of ROE and GO are included in the last three columns.
The coefficients on ROEt−1 and V ROEt−1 lose their significance. The coefficient on
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GOt−1 is significant when SENT
⊥
t−1 or TOt−1 are controlled, but turns insignificant
whenMISVt−1 is controlled. The coefficient on V GOt−1 is significant only in column
(7). After controlling changes in profitability and growth options, the coefficients on
the three overconfidence measures remain significant.
Results in Table VII suggest that in explaining changes in idiosyncratic risk
over time, the explanatory power of profitability is weak while that of growth option
is relatively strong. And the control of both profitability and growth option does not
diminish the explanatory powers of the overconfidence measures.
C. Time-Series Tests in Subsamples
In Wei and Zhang’s (2006) study, ROEt−1 and V ROEt−1 performs well in
explaining the time trend of idiosyncratic risk in full sample. However, when examine
the time-series relation between idiosyncratic risk and ROE in old firms, the
profitability variables lose their explanatory powers. Cao et al. (2007) find that their
growth option variables do not perform equally well in explaining the time trend
of idiosyncratic risk in NYSE/AMEX stocks and in NASDAQ stocks. Therefore,
we conduct time-series tests based on subsamples in this section. Subsamples are
formed based on age and exchange market, respectively.
C..1 Age
We partition our sample into two sub-samples based on firm age, which is
counted from one firm’s first appearance in the CRSP to the end of the last year.
Stocks are sorted based on age, and those that fall into the lowest and highest
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thirtieth percentiles are classified as young and old, respectively. Figure 3 plots the
idiosyncratic risk of young and old stocks, and confirms Pastor and Veronesi’s (2003)
observation that the idiosyncratic risk of younger stocks is higher than that of older
ones.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
The levels of turnover and misvaluation for these sub-samples are plotted in
Figure 4. The sentiment proxy is dropped as it has data only for the market as a
whole. Both turnover and misvaluation increase overall in each of the sub-samples,
which suggests that the increasing trend in overconfidence is not simply capturing
the effect of age.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Interestingly, Figure 4 shows that the stock turnover and misvaluation of young
firms are higher than those of old firms. This may have some implications for how
overconfidence affects stocks with different characteristics. Baker and Wurgler (2006)
find that sentiment does not affect different stocks equally. Their results show that
returns of young stocks are more sensitive to investor sentiment than are old stocks.
Similarly, it is possible that overconfidence affects different stocks differently: young
stocks may be more subject to investor overconfidence influence than are old ones.
The unequal impact that overconfidence has on different stocks is an interesting
topic to explore in the future.
23
We regress idiosyncratic risk on the overconfidence measures within each sub-
sample, controlling for profitability and the growth option. The results are shown in
Table VIII. Row (1) in each panel shows the result of regressing idiosyncratic risk on
profitability and growth option measures simultaneously. Sentiment, turnover, and
misvaluation are added in rows (2) to (4).
[Insert Table VIII here]
In panel A with younger stocks, the coefficients on ROEt−1 and V ROEt−1
are both significant across the rows, and are consistently negative and positive,
respectively. However, they both turn out to be insignificant for the older stocks
sample in panel B. The finding of the better performance of ROEt−1 and V ROEt−1
in younger stocks is consistent with Wei and Zhang’s (2006) findings.
Unlike ROEt−1 and V ROEt−1, GOt−1 is more powerful in panel B with older
stock. The coefficient on GOt−1 is only significant in row (3) in panel A, and the
coefficient on V GOt−1 is either insignificant or of opposite sign in both panels.
The overconfidence measures are included in rows (2), (3), and (4) in panels A
and B. The coefficients on all three overconfidence measures are significantly positive
at 1% level, in both the younger and older stock groups. These results suggest that
the explanatory power of overconfidence is not constrained when profitability and
the growth option are controlled, and that it is not driven simply by age effects.
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C..2 Exchange Markets
We next split stocks into NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks, based on where
they are listed. This division helps to roughly control firm size, as larger firms are
more likely to be listed in the NYSE/AMEX, whereas smaller firms are more likely
to appear in the NASDAQ. Cao et al. (2007) find that their GOt−1 and V GOt−1
measures do not perform equally well in different markets: GOt−1 is significant in
both markets, whereas V GOt−1 is significant only in the NYSE/AMEX market.
They interpret this as the result of larger firms having more free cash flow and more
flexibility in choosing and timing investments. The results of the sub-sample tests
are presented in Table IX.
[Insert Table IX here]
Idiosyncratic risk is regressed on profitability and growth option measures in row
(1) of panels A and B. The coefficient on ROEt−1 is insignificant in both panels. The
coefficient on V ROEt−1 is significantly positive in panel B with NASDAQ stocks,
but turns negative in panel A with NYSE/AMEX stocks. For the growth option
measure, the coefficients on GOt−1 and V GOt−1 are both significantly positive in
panels A with NYSE/AMEX stocks, but lose their significance in most of the rows
in panel B with NASDAQ stocks.
Next, we examine the performance of the overconfidence measures in these two
types of markets. The coefficients on TOt−1 andMISVt−1 are significantly positive in
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both panels. The coefficient on SENT⊥t−1 is significant among NYSE/AMEX stocks
at 1% level, but is insignificant among NASDAQ stocks.
Tables VIII and IX together suggest that the time-series relationship between
overconfidence and the idiosyncratic risk is generally robust not only when control-
ling for the profitability and growth option measures, but also to the division of
the sample based on age and exchange market. The power of the profitability and
growth option measures, on the other hand, tends to be stronger among some stocks
and weaker in others. It is desirable that further tests be conducted to confirm that
these measures are not simply capturing the effects of some other variables. This
could be a direction for future research.
IV. The Evolution of Overconfidence and the Time Pattern of
Idiosyncratic Risk
Tests in previous sections show that idiosyncratic risk is positively correlated
with investor overconfidence at both the individual stock level and the market
level. Figure 2 and unreported tests show that investor overconfidence increases
significantly over the whole sample period, especially for the period before 2000.
The increasing time trend in idiosyncratic risk documented by Campbell et al. (2001)
could therefore be partially driven by changes in investor overconfidence over time.
The increase in overconfidence is consistent with predictions made in studies
on the evolution of overconfidence. Although studies in this research stream adopt
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various theoretical frameworks rooted in diverse intuitions, their conclusions are
consistent: overconfident investors gain an evolutionary advantage.
Kyle and Wang (1997) posit that in a Cournot duopoly setting, overconfidence
strictly dominates rationality, as overconfident investors have a reputation for trading
aggressively, which intimidates rational or underconfident traders and leads them
to trade less than optimally and make lower profits. Bernardo and Welch (2001)
argue that overconfident investors are less likely to imitate their peers and more
likely to explore the environment. Their trading activities then broadcast valuable
information in their social group. As a result, a group with more overconfident
investors gains an evolutionary advantage over groups with few such investors.
Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) assert that overconfident traders are willing to take
on more risks and hence are better than their rational counterparts at exploiting
mispricing caused by liquidity or noise traders, and therefore persist in the market.
Weinberg (2006) shows that moderately overestimating one’s own ability leads a
person to undertake challenging tasks more often, yielding higher expected output
and utility. Weinberg states that it is reasonable to expect populations to evolve
towards overconfidence, either because overconfident individuals with higher utility
and output tend to have more offspring, or because younger generations become
more overconfident by emulating successful individuals in the preceding generation.
However, it is worth noting that all the papers on the evolution of overconfidence
mentioned previously stress that although overconfidence is advantageous and
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pervasive, it works to the advantage of overconfident investors only when their
overconfidence level is moderately high. Investors with an extremely high level of
overconfidence suffer, as they rely only on their own information and make mistakes
too often (Bernardo and Welch, 2001), trade too aggressively and push price against
them excessively (Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001), or undertake challenging tasks even
when the expected output is low and lowers their expected utility (Weinberg, 2006).
Figure 1 shows that idiosyncratic risk, although manifesting an increasing
trend over the whole sample period, decreased sharply after reaching a peak in
2000. The downward trend of idiosyncratic risk continues to the end of the sample
period. Meanwhile, the three overconfidence measures in Figure 2 turn downwards at
approximately the same time. The decrease in idiosyncratic risk and overconfidence
lasts for years, and it seems difficult to attribute this decrease to simple time series
fluctuations.
It is likely that investor overconfidence has accumulated to some extremely high
level by the year 2000. The extremely high level of overconfidence leads investors
to fail too frequently, and the cost of failures outweighs the benefits brought by
overconfidence. The mass failures of these extremely overconfident investors in turn
causes the market level of overconfidence to decrease. The drop in idiosyncratic risk




This paper tries to establish a link between investor overconfidence and
idiosyncratic risk, and explain the time pattern of idiosyncratic risk from a behavioral
perspective. “Overconfidence,” describes the tendency of people to overestimate the
sophistication of their skills. In the financial market, overconfidence is translated as
the overestimation of investors of the precision of their private information. Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) argue that overconfidence increases stock
return volatility. Based on their work, we predict that overconfidence is positively
correlated with idiosyncratic risk, and is partially responsible for the time pattern
of idiosyncratic risk.
We use three proxies for overconfidence in this paper: investor sentiment, stock
turnover, and stock misvaluation. Investor sentiment measures market conditions
and could be a proxy for overconfidence, as previous studies suggest that overconfi-
dence will be high following a bullish market. High stock turnover could be driven
by heterogeneous beliefs promoted by overconfidence in one’s own private informa-
tion. Misvaluation is a direct result of overshooting by overconfident investors who
overreact to their private information.
Cross-sectionally, we find that overconfidence is positively correlated with
idiosyncratic risk. Controlling for some variables suggested by previous studies to be
determinants of idiosyncratic risk, including firm age, size, stock price, profitability
and growth option, does not affect the significance of the overconfidence measures.
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In time-series regressions, we find that after adding any of the three overcon-
fidence proxies, the positive time trend in idiosyncratic risk is reduced or even
redirected. To check the robustness of the results, we conduct multivariate tests
controlling for both the profitability and growth option measures. Our overconfi-
dence measures survive all tests. We also perform sub-sample tests based on age and
exchange market, respectively. Overconfidence offers significant explanatory powers
of the dynamics of idiosyncratic risk in all sub-samples.
Finally, we discuss the evolution of overconfidence over time and its relation with
the time pattern of idiosyncratic risk. Both idiosyncratic risk and overconfidence
increase significantly over the whole sample period, but decrease dramatically after
2000. The overall increasing trend in overconfidence is not surprising. Investors
may become more overconfident as time passes as a result of the accumulation of
investment expertise, the surge of information, or less credibility placed on public
information. An increase in overconfidence is also consistent with the predictions
in the literature of the evolution of overconfidence, which argue that overconfident
investors can better survive as such investors more actively explore information, take
on more challenging tasks, and increase group welfare. As the population evolves,
more adaptable overconfident investors may dominate the market and increase
market-level overconfidence.
However, research on the evolution of overconfidence also stresses that overcon-
fidence is beneficial only when the level of overconfidence is not too high. Extremely
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high overconfidence may lead investors to fail too frequently, and the cost of over-
confidence will exceed the benefits it brings. This may help to explain the dramatic
and prolonged decrease in overconfidence after it hits a peak around 2000, and the
subsequent decrease in idiosyncratic risk over the same period.
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Figure 1. Time trend of idiosyncratic risk. This figure plots the time series of
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Figure 2. Time trend of investor overconfidence measures. This figure
plots the time series of overconfidence measures. Figures 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c)
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Figure 3. Idiosyncratic risk of young and old firms. This figure plots the
time series of idiosyncratic risk, Vt, of young and old firms, respectively. The solid
line and dashed line represent idiosyncratic risk of old and young firms,
respectively.
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Figure 4. Overconfidence towards young and old firms. This figure plots
the time series of stock turnover, TOt−1, and misvaluation, MISVt−1, of young and
old firms. The unbold solid line and unbold dashed line represent stock turnover of
old and young firms, respectively. The bold solid line and bold dashed line
represent stock misvaluation of old and young firms, respectively.
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Table I: Summary Statistics
Vt is the monthly value-weighted idiosyncratic risk of individual stocks in month
t, based on stocks’ market capitalizations at the end of the previous month. Vt is
calculated based on the beta free method, which is described in section I.A. SENT⊥t
is the monthly investor sentiment index taken from Jeffrey Wurgler’s homepage.
TOt is the monthly value-weighted stock turnover. MISVt is the value-weighted
misvaluation of stocks. SIZEi,t denotes market capitalization of firm i at month t.
ROEt is the value-weighted return on equity. (M/B)t is the value-weighted market
value to book value ratio. (M/V )t is the component of (M/B)t that captures the
misvaluation of firms, and (V/B)t is the component of (M/B)t that denotes the
growth option. V ROEt, (VM/B)t, (V V/B)t, and (VM/V )t are the time-series
variances of the corresponding measures based on data in the previous 36 months.
All accounting data are winsorized at the 2.5% level at the head and tail.
Table I(a): Summary Statistics of Idiosyncratic Risk
Vt
Periods (1) No. of Obs. (2) Mean (3) Median (4) Std. (5) Skewness (6) Kurtosis
1971-1975 248681 0.0074 0.0066 0.0032 1.2654 1.3224
1976-1980 293659 0.0066 0.0054 0.0038 2.2314 5.5013
1981-1985 347426 0.0081 0.0074 0.0026 1.1894 2.1436
1986-1990 410113 0.0076 0.0067 0.0050 5.7084 38.6588
1991-1995 445805 0.0077 0.0074 0.0012 0.6288 -0.2521
1996-2000 524257 0.0158 0.0118 0.0103 1.7554 2.8781
2001-2005 423894 0.0093 0.0062 0.0069 2.0126 4.5164
All 2693835 0.0089 0.0073 0.0062 3.3741 14.8656
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Table I(b): Summary Statistics of Overconfidence Measures, Profitability, and M/B Ratio with
its Components
Panel A - Overconfidence Measures
(1) SENT⊥t (2) TOt (3) MISVt
Periods Mean of Median of Mean of Median of Mean of Median of
SENT⊥t SENT
⊥
t TOt TOt MISVt MISVt
1971-1975 -0.7102 -0.6947 0.1572 0.1546 - -
1976-1980 -0.8285 -1.1118 0.2419 0.2411 0.2243 0.2007
1981-1985 1.0414 0.9321 0.4699 0.4787 0.2080 0.2009
1986-1990 -0.2229 -0.3600 0.6392 0.6209 0.2821 0.2702
1991-1995 -0.1770 -0.1650 0.6847 0.6830 0.3899 0.3919
1996-2000 0.4895 0.3933 1.1179 1.0107 0.7244 0.7383
2001-2005 -0.0503 -0.2142 1.4003 1.3877 0.5122 0.4594
All -0.0654 -0.1117 0.6730 0.6045 0.3902 0.3463
Panel B - SIZE and ROE
(1) SIZEi,t (2) ROEt (3) V ROEt
Periods Mean of Median of Mean of Median of Mean of Median of
SIZEi,t SIZEi,t ROEt ROEt V ROEt V ROEt
1971-1975 209327 20676 - - - -
1976-1980 211721 24306 0.0433 0.0431 0.0004 0.0004
1981-1985 301288 34337 0.0384 0.0379 0.0010 0.0011
1986-1990 425106 38747 0.0396 0.0406 0.0024 0.0025
1991-1995 638126 67022 0.0432 0.0434 0.0029 0.0030
1996-2000 1411761 117012 0.0503 0.0502 0.0041 0.0039
2001-2005 2049038 187234 0.0405 0.0420 0.0044 0.0044
All 848763 60332 0.0426 0.0426 0.0025 0.0028
Panel C - M/B and its Components
(1) (M/B)t (2) (V/B)t (3) (M/V )t
Periods Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of Mean of
(M/B)t (V M/B)t (V/B)t (V V/B)t (M/V )t (V M/V )t
1976-1980 1.4604 0.0864 1.3636 0.0090 1.0469 0.0255
1981-1985 1.4854 0.0895 1.3693 0.0278 1.0650 0.0253
1986-1990 1.7486 0.1109 1.3968 0.0480 1.2221 0.0319
1991-1995 2.1007 0.1680 1.4721 0.0565 1.3599 0.0362
1996-2000 3.1251 0.3769 1.6202 0.0833 1.7087 0.0592
2001-2005 2.3798 0.4353 1.5071 0.0963 1.4849 0.0641
All 2.0500 0.2112 1.4549 0.0535 1.3146 0.0404
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Table II: Idiosyncratic Risk, M/B Ratio, and M/B Components
For each month, (M/B)i,t is calculated following Cao et al. (2007). It is then
decomposed to get (V/B)i,t and (M/V )i,t. The methodology for decomposition is
described in section I.A. The ratios (M/B)i,t, (V/B)i,t, and (M/V )i,t are value
weighted monthly to get (M/B)t, (V/B)t and (M/V )t, respectively. (VM/B)t,
(V V/B)t and (VM/V )t are the value-weighted time-series variances of (M/B)i,t,
(V/B)i,t and (M/V )i,t, respectively, based on data in the previous 36 months. Firm
months with fewer than nine observations in the previous three years are deleted. The
monthly value-weighted idiosyncratic risk, Vt, is regressed on a time trend measure
t, and (M/B)t−1, (V/B)t−1 and (M/V )t−1, respectively. Data cover the period from
01/1976 to 12/2005. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on Newy-West
standard errors with 12-month lags. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Intercept t Adj.R2
(1) 0.004672*** 0.000020** 0.1218
(4.54) (2.14)
Intercept t (M/B)t−1 (V M/B)t−1 Adj.R
2
(2) -0.004300** -0.000030*** 0.007534*** 0.009428* 0.5659
(-2.00) (-2.85) (5.37) (1.85)
Intercept t (V/B)t−1 (V V/B)t−1 Adj.R
2
(3) -0.046830*** -0.000030*** 0.038950*** 0.088895*** 0.5800
(-4.92) (-6.57) (5.45) (5.25)
Intercept t (M/V )t−1 (V M/V )t−1 Adj.R
2
(4) -0.015150*** -0.000030** 0.019791*** 0.059357 0.4543
(-2.85) (-2.03) (3.93) (0.99)
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Table III: Idiosyncratic Risk and Investor Overconfidence: Cross-Sectional Tests
For each month between 01/1976 and 12/2005, idiosyncratic risk, Vi,t, is cross-sectionally regressed on overconfidence measures
and some control variables. RETi,t is the stock return. SIZEi,t is the log of the market capitalization of firm i. LEVi,t is the
leverage ratio calculated by dividing total liabilities by total assets. AGEi,t is the log of the number of years since firm i’s first
appearance in the CRSP. PRCi,t is the stock price. ROEi,t is the return on equity. (M/B)i,t is the market value to book value
ratio. GOi,t measures the long-term growth option and is free of the influence of misvaluation. TOi,t is the stock turnover. MISVi,t
is the misvaluation of firm i’s stock. V ROEi,t, (VM/B)i,t, and V GOi,t are time-series variances of the corresponding measures
based on data in the previous 36 months. The averages of the estimated coefficients over the whole sample period are multiplied
by 100 and reported. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on the time-series means and standard errors of the estimated
coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Vi,t = β0 + β1RETi,t−1 + β2SIZEi,t−1 + β3LEVi,t−1 + β4AGEi,t + β5PRCi,t−1 + β6ROEi,t−1 + β7V ROEi,t−1 + β8GOi,t−1 +
β9V GOi,t−1 + β10OCi,t−1 + ǫi,t.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept 0.8443*** 0.7399*** 0.8247*** 0.6878*** 0.8474*** 0.7877*** 0.7324*** 0.6783*** 0.6352*** 0.6142***
(26.86) (26.55) (26.88) (26.38) (27.23) (26.61) (25.95) (25.60) (25.07) (24.66)
RETi,t−1 -0.1984*** -0.1868*** -0.1947*** -0.2019*** -0.2074*** -0.1987*** -0.1915*** -0.1913*** -0.1952*** -0.1896***
(-10.63) (-10.54) (-10.58) (-11.19) (-11.24) (-10.90) (-10.80) (-10.82) (-11.20) (-10.92)
SIZEi,t−1 -0.0598*** -0.0523*** -0.0615*** -0.0543*** -0.0614*** -0.0603*** -0.0527*** -0.0488*** -0.1952*** -0.0500***
(-25.03) (-24.41) (-26.18) (-26.07) (-25.88) (-25.08) (-24.59) (-23.93) (-11.20) (-23.88)
LEVi,t−1 0.0069 -0.0186*** 0.0404*** 0.0718*** 0.0117* 0.0596*** -0.0084 0.0141** 0.0410*** 0.0683***
(1.02) (-2.66) (6.32) (11.48) (1.74) (9.41) (-1.27) (2.24) (6.60) (10.81)
AGEi,t -0.0070*** -0.0017** -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0048*** -0.0028*** 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0024*** 0.0030***
(-8.12) (-2.15) (-0.68) (-1.57) (-5.82) (-3.39) (1.62) (-1.04) (2.91) (3.54)
PRCi,t−1 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(-6.77) (-7.46) (-7.82) (-6.60) (-6.98)
ROEi,t−1 -0.3724*** -0.3597*** -0.3600*** -0.3285*** -0.3284***
(-22.05) (-21.78) (-21.82) (-21.13) (-21.10)
V ROEi,t−1 1.4829*** 1.4056*** 1.4283*** 1.0264*** 0.9781***
(23.22) (21.80) (21.98) (15.94) (15.41)
(M/B)i,t−1 0.0063*** -0.0020** -0.0207***
(8.39) (-2.23) (-12.78)
(V M/B)i,t−1 0.0303*** 0.0181*** 0.0186***
(20.70) (14.19) (14.36)
GOi,t−1 0.0379*** 0.0340*** 0.0303***
(19.43) (16.57) (15.28)
V GOi,t−1 0.0024* -0.0076*** -0.0072***
(1.92) (-5.52) (-5.36)
TOi,t−1 0.0126*** 0.0091*** 0.0086***
(12.63) (9.73) (9.01)
MISVi,t−1 0.1357*** 0.1454*** 0.0905***
(23.21) (20.39) (22.35)
Adj.R2 0.0870 0.1092 0.0925 0.1059 0.0903 0.0949 0.1150 0.1188 0.1267 0.1274
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Table IV: Cross-Sectional Tests in Subsamples
For each month between 01/1976 and 12/2005, stocks are sorted from low to high based on their size, age, or stock price,
separately. Stocks in the lowest and highest thirtieth percentiles are classified as Low (L) and High (H), respectively. Stocks in the
middle fortieth percentile are classified as Medium (M). Within each subgroup, idiosyncratic risk, Vi,t, is cross-sectionally regressed
on overconfidence measures and some control variables.The averages of the estimated coefficients for each fiver-year-subperiod are
multiplied by 100 and reported. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on the time-series means and standard errors of
the estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Vi,t = β0 + β1RETi,t−1 + β2SIZEi,t−1 + β3LEVi,t−1 + β4AGEi,t + β5PRCi,t−1 + β6ROEi,t−1 + β7V ROEi,t−1 + β8GOi,t−1 +
β9V GOi,t−1 + β10OCi,t−1 + ǫi,t.
Intercept RETi,t−1 SIZEi,t−1 LEVi,t−1 AGEi,t PRCi,t−1 ROEi,t−1 V ROEi,t−1 GOi,t−1 V GOi,t−1 OCi,t−1 Adj.R
2
Panel A: Subsample Tests Based on Size, OCi,t−1=TOi,t−1
(1)L 0.0141*** -0.0020*** -0.0021*** -0.0009*** 0.0003* -0.0002*** -0.0021*** 0.0052*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.1629
(12.44) (-20.38) (-9.27) (-8.52) (1.66) (-8.05) (-8.84) (4.32) (4.72) (-2.69) (8.14)
(2)M 0.0030*** -0.0006*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0009*** 0.0037*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.1761
(30.04) (-27.10) (-3.57) (-7.71) (-3.96) (-10.02) (-13.57) (14.93) (8.88) (-0.65) (22.11)
(3)H 0.0011*** -0.0002*** -0.0003*** 0.0000*** -0.0001*** 0.0000*** -0.0005*** 0.0047*** 0.0001*** -0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.1909
(36.03) (-16.60) (-4.55) (-7.99) (-6.53) (-14.88) (-10.74) (7.77) (23.29) (-3.43) (21.08)
Panel B: Subsample Tests Based on Size, OCi,t−1=MISVi,t−1
(1)L 0.0151*** -0.0021*** -0.0019*** -0.0010*** -0.0001 -0.0002*** -0.0021*** 0.0055*** 0.0002*** -0.0001** -0.0014*** 0.1616
(12.89) (-19.26) (-8.81) (-8.61) (-1.02) (-8.31) (-8.79) (4.56) (5.93) (-2.49) (-7.63)
(2)M 0.0028*** -0.0006*** -0.0001* 0.0000*** -0.0001** -0.0001*** -0.0010*** 0.0037*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.1689
(28.33) (-27.51) (-1.87) (-5.51) (-2.43) (-11.28) (-13.81) (15.19) (8.72) (-0.15) (13.19)
(3)H 0.0013*** -0.0002*** -0.0001** 0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0007*** 0.0053*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.1583
(30.49) (-15.98) (-2.54) (-9.92) (-4.63) (-16.80) (-14.15) (8.02) (26.21) (-3.11) (14.41)
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Intercept RETi,t−1 SIZEi,t−1 LEVi,t−1 AGEi,t PRCi,t−1 ROEi,t−1 V ROEi,t−1 GOi,t−1 V GOi,t−1 OCi,t−1 Adj.R
2
Panel C: Subsample Tests Based on Age, OCi,t−1=TOi,t−1
(1)L 0.0050*** -0.0016*** -0.0016*** 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000* -0.0016*** 0.0084*** 0.0000** -0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.1867
(16.18) (-18.55) (-9.55) (-0.74) (-1.51) (-1.77) (-6.89) (6.89) (2.20) (-3.98) (16.78)
(2)M 0.0033*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001** -0.0019*** 0.0023*** 0.0002*** 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.1974
(11.33) (-21.00) (-5.79) (3.13) (0.02) (2.57) (-8.90) (2.74) (7.63) (-1.61) (11.02)
(3)H 0.0022*** -0.0008*** -0.0006*** 0.0000** -0.0005*** 0.0001*** -0.0022*** 0.0089*** 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.2422
(21.72) (-20.03) (-3.97) (2.13) (-10.74) (4.25) (-10.57) (10.80) (6.16) (4.45) (11.98)
Panel D: Subsample Tests Based on Age, OCi,t−1=MISVi,t−1
(1)L 0.0051*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0016*** 0.0083*** 0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0006*** 0.1842
(16.22) (-18.32) (-9.02) (-1.50) (0.29) (-1.22) (-6.83) (6.72) (1.61) (-3.49) (10.16)
(2)M 0.0032*** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001* -0.0019*** 0.0026*** 0.0002*** -0.0001* 0.0004*** 0.1964
(11.45) (-20.34) (-5.18) (3.58) (1.03) (1.87) (-9.12) (3.20) (7.35) (-1.68) (7.48)
(3)H 0.0022*** -0.0007*** -0.0005*** 0.0000* -0.0004*** 0.0000*** -0.0023*** 0.0090*** 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.2377
(20.89) (-19.74) (-3.26) (1.95) (-7.63) (3.15) (-11.09) (10.93) (5.10) (4.44) (12.63)
Panel E: Subsample Tests Based on Stock Price, OCi,t−1=TOi,t−1
(1)L 0.0100*** -0.0028*** -0.0021*** -0.0004*** 0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0017*** 0.0035*** 0.0001** -0.0001** 0.0005*** 0.1480
(14.76) (-18.40) (-9.94) (-7.28) (2.83) (-10.24) (-9.07) (3.78) (2.47) (-2.16) (10.17)
(2)M 0.0022*** -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0002*** -0.0001*** -0.0007*** 0.0031*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.1116
(28.81) (-13.93) (-3.33) (-13.20) (-10.22) (-22.63) (-16.34) (10.87) (19.26) (-0.60) (21.83)
(3)H 0.0009*** -0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0001*** 0.0000*** -0.0004*** 0.0025*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.1471
(37.53) (-12.61) (1.29) (-20.91) (-4.78) (-13.69) (-11.04) (5.59) (25.40) (0.50) (21.14)
Panel F: Subsample Tests Based on Stock Price, OCi,t−1=MISVi,t−1
(1)L 0.0108*** -0.0029*** -0.0019*** -0.0004*** 0.0001 -0.0003*** -0.0018*** 0.0038*** 0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0012*** 0.1454
(15.09) (-18.07) (-9.29) (-7.05) (0.39) (-10.93) (-9.48) (4.16) (3.31) (-1.83) (-7.21)
(2)M 0.0021*** -0.0004*** 0.0000 0.0000*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0007*** 0.0036*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0964
(28.64) (-13.76) (-0.92) (-9.93) (-8.52) (-24.82) (-17.51) (11.39) (20.03) (0.47) (10.31)
(3)H 0.0010*** -0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0000*** 0.0000** 0.0000*** -0.0005*** 0.0025*** 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001*** 0.1210
(33.06) (-12.19) (5.68) (-23.79) (-2.18) (-15.80) (-11.85) (5.84) (27.73) (1.59) (14.62)
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Table V: Cross-Sectional Tests in Subperiods
For each month between 01/1976 and 12/2005, idiosyncratic risk, Vi,t, is cross-sectionally regressed on overconfidence measures
and some control variables. RETi,t is the stock return. SIZEi,t is the log of the market capitalization of firm i. LEVi,t is the
leverage ratio calculated by dividing total liabilities by total assets. AGEi,t is the log of the number of years since firm i’s first
appearance in the CRSP. PRCi,t is the stock price. ROEi,t is the return on equity. GOi,t measures the long-term growth option
and is free of the influence of misvaluation. TOi,t is the stock turnover. MISVi,t is the misvaluation of firm i’s stock. V ROEi,t
and V GOi,t are time-series variances of the corresponding measures based on data in the previous 36 months. The averages of the
estimated coefficients for each fiver-year-subperiod are multiplied by 100 and reported. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios
based on the time-series means and standard errors of the estimated coefficients. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Vi,t = β0 + β1RETi,t−1 + β2SIZEi,t−1 + β3LEVi,t−1 + β4AGEi,t + β5PRCi,t−1 + β6ROEi,t−1 + β7V ROEi,t−1 + β8GOi,t−1 +
β9V GOi,t−1 + β10OCi,t−1 + ǫi,t.
Panel A: OC=Stock Turnover
Intercept RETi,t−1 SIZEi,t−1 LEVi,t−1 AGEi,t PRCi,t−1 ROEi,t−1 V ROEi,t−1 GOi,t−1 V GOi,t−1 TOi,t−1 Adj.R
2
1976.01-1980.12
0.1618*** -0.0161 -0.0182*** 0.0505*** 0.0044*** -0.0002*** -0.2882*** 1.3625*** 0.0633*** -0.0316*** 0.0076*** 0.2298
(19.26) (-1.58) (-24.63) (11.92) (7.89) (-6.88) (-18.26) (11.97) (17.19) (-5.10) (3.98)
1981.01-1985.12
0.2170*** -0.0912*** -0.0157*** 0.0284*** -0.0046*** -0.0003*** -0.1744*** 0.9355*** 0.0195*** -0.0082*** 0.0150*** 0.1290
(20.23) (-5.60) (-20.23) (6.39) (-5.53) (-7.46) (-6.06) (8.40) (9.31) (-3.00) (7.44)
1986.01-1990.12
0.6056*** -0.2321*** -0.0435*** 0.0409*** -0.0067*** 0.0000** -0.2742*** 0.7708*** 0.0022** -0.0015** 0.0078*** 0.0862
(16.32) (-8.14) (-14.74) (2.59) (-4.51) (2.06) (-12.25) (12.57) (2.11) (-2.44) (4.22)
1991.01-1995.12
1.1786*** -0.3464*** -0.0992*** 0.0869*** 0.0195*** 0.0000*** -0.5104*** 0.5725*** 0.0641*** -0.0044** -0.0008 0.1021
(24.10) (-5.57) (-23.85) (5.88) (8.82) (10.27) (-11.09) (5.02) (10.57) (-2.57) (-0.20)
1996.01-2000.12
1.0026*** -0.2965*** -0.0758*** -0.0002 0.0022 0.0000*** -0.4331*** 1.5710*** 0.0386*** -0.0004 0.0131*** 0.1039
(21.66) (-6.63) (-20.99) (-0.02) (0.89) (15.49) (-9.06) (8.12) (6.38) (-0.17) (6.61)
2001.01-2005.12
0.6454*** -0.1891*** -0.0473*** 0.0392 -0.0006 0.0000*** -0.2909*** 0.9459*** 0.0164*** 0.0007 0.0089*** 0.1095
(11.13) (-3.53) (-10.22) (1.44) (-0.36) (7.39) (-7.05) (3.80) (6.43) (0.55) (5.92)
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Panel B: OC=Stock Misvaluation
Intercept RETi,t−1 SIZEi,t−1 LEVi,t−1 AGEi,t PRCi,t−1 ROEi,t−1 V ROEi,t−1 GOi,t−1 V GOi,t−1 MISVi,t−1 Adj.R
2
1976.01-1980.12
0.1437*** -0.0102 -0.0163*** 0.0606*** 0.0027*** -0.0002*** -0.2913*** 1.3997*** 0.0578*** -0.0300*** 0.0403*** 0.2314
(17.09) (-0.96) (-21.13) (15.19) (4.56) (-7.69) (-18.52) (12.26) (15.71) (-4.89) (13.13)
1981.01-1985.12
0.2020*** -0.0859*** -0.0144*** 0.0349*** -0.0046*** -0.0003*** -0.1784*** 0.9297*** 0.0180*** -0.0079*** 0.0279*** 0.1280
(20.43) (-5.33) (-19.33) (7.95) (-5.56) (-7.84) (-6.24) (8.10) (9.32) (-2.92) (9.09)
1986.01-1990.12
0.5707*** -0.2290*** -0.0417*** 0.0566*** -0.0061*** 0.0000* -0.2729*** 0.7112*** 0.0005 -0.0016*** 0.0596*** 0.0875
(15.82) (-8.11) (-14.69) (3.47) (-4.05) (1.86) (-12.00) (11.65) (0.47) (-2.63) (9.90)
1991.01-1995.12
1.1183*** -0.3537*** -0.0994*** 0.1422*** 0.0235*** 0.0000*** -0.5087*** 0.4903*** 0.0582*** -0.0045*** 0.1748*** 0.0996
(24.83) (-5.80) (-24.38) (8.58) (10.27) (9.98) (-10.93) (4.37) (9.81) (-2.63) (18.56)
1996.01-2000.12
1.0221*** -0.2792*** -0.0812*** 0.0480*** 0.0043* 0.0000*** -0.4274*** 1.4470*** 0.0337*** -0.0003 0.1579*** 0.1072
(22.08) (-6.33) (-21.54) (4.94) (1.68) (16.85) (-8.87) (7.83) (5.58) (-0.13) (19.31)
2001.01-2005.12
0.6284*** -0.1798*** -0.0471*** 0.0674*** -0.0015 0.0000*** -0.2920*** 0.8905*** 0.0135*** 0.0010 0.0825*** 0.1108
(10.93) (-3.30) (-10.32) (2.58) (-0.96) (7.79) (-7.13) (3.63) (5.50) (0.77) (10.09)
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Table VI: Idiosyncratic Risk and Investor Overconfidence: Time-Series
Tests
The monthly value-weighted idiosyncratic risk, Vt, is regressed on a time trend
measure t and the overconfidence measures. SENT⊥t is the monthly investor
sentiment index taken from Jeffrey Wurgler’s homepage. TOt is the value-weighted
stock turnover. MISVt is the value-weighted misvaluation of stocks. MISVt covers
the period from 01/1976 to 12/2005. All other data cover the period from 01/1971
to 12/2005. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on Newy-West standard
errors with 12-month lags. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Vt = β0 + β1t+ β2OCt−1 + ǫt.
Panel A: SENT⊥t−1–Sentiment Index
Intercept t SENT⊥t−1 Adj.R
2
(1) 0.005922*** 0.000014* 0.0773
(5.18) (1.78)
(2) 0.006936*** 0.000010* 0.002124** 0.1653
(6.70) (1.65) (2.09)
Panel B: TOt−1–Stock Turnover
Intercept t TOt−1 Adj.R
2
(1) 0.004656*** 0.000018** 0.1266
(4.16) ( 2.25)
(2) 0.005243*** -0.000030* 0.014365** 0.2867
(5.34) (-1.69) (2.18)
Panel C: MISVt−1–Stock Misvaluation
Intercept t MISVt−1 Adj.R
2
(1) 0.00537*** 0.000017** 0.0887
(4.27) (1.82)
(2) 0.001149 -0.000010** 0.025766*** 0.4615
(0.74) (-1.84) (4.05)
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Table VII: Profitability, Growth options, and Overconfidence
The monthly value-weighted idiosyncratic risk, Vt, is regressed on a time trend
measure t, the overconfidence measures, and the profitability and growth option
measures. SENT⊥t is the investor sentiment index taken from Jeffrey Wurgler’s
homepage. TOt is the value-weighted stock turnover.MISVt measures misvaluation.
ROEt is the value-weighted return on equity in month t. GOt is the value-weighted
measure of the long-term growth option. The time-series variances of individual
stocks’ return on equity and long-term growth option over the previous 36 months
are calculated and value weighted to get V ROEt and V GOt, respectively. Data
cover the period 01/1976-12/2005. The estimated coefficients over the whole sample
period are multiplied by 100 and reported. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios
based on Newy-West standard errors with 12-month lags. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Vt = β0 + β1t+ β2OCt−1 + β3ROEt−1 + β4V ROEt−1 + β5GOt−1 + β6V GOt−1 + ǫt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 0.4657*** 0.5017*** 0.2204* 0.1213 -4.4450*** -4.4670*** -2.0220
( 4.52) ( 4.97) ( 1.68) (0.89) ( -4.82) ( -5.18) (-1.38)
t 0.0020** 0.0018** -0.0040*** -0.0020** -0.0040*** -0.0060*** -0.0040***
( 2.14) ( 2.32) ( -2.60) (-2.03) ( -3.39) (-5.09) (-3.02)
SENT⊥t−1 0.2249** 0.1164***
( 2.17) ( 2.66)
TOt−1 1.9228*** 0.9319***
( 3.33) ( 3.64)
MISVt−1 2.6304*** 1.2366**
(4.19) (2.56)
ROEt−1 -4.8190 -1.2040 2.1849
( -0.47) ( -0.15) (0.19)
V ROEt−1 96.5320 38.0726 4.4702
( 0.72) ( 0.38) (0.03)
GOt−1 3.8737*** 3.6782*** 1.6937
( 4.15) ( 4.45) (1.22)
V GOt−1 5.9111 4.6986 8.7212**
( 1.59) ( 1.42) (2.51)
Adj.R2 0.1224 0.2329 0.3859 0.4994 0.5993 0.6155 0.5964
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Table VIII: Time-Series Subsample Tests based on Age
For each month, stocks are divided into young and old groups based on their age, which is counted from their first appearance in the
CRSP to the end of the last year. Stocks are sorted based on age, and those that fall into the lowest and highest thirtieth percentiles
are classified as young and old, respectively. Within each group, idiosyncratic risk, Vt, is regressed on a time trend measure t,
profitability, growth option, and the overconfidence measures. ROEt is the value-weighted return on equity in month t. GOt is
the value-weighted measure of the long-term growth option. SENT⊥t is the investor sentiment index taken from Jeffrey Wurgler’s
homepage. TOt is the value-weighted stock turnover.MISVt measures misvaluation. The time-series variances of individual stocks’
return on equity and long-term growth option over the previous 36 months are calculated and value weighted to get V ROEt and
V GOt, respectively. Data cover the period 01/1976-12/2005. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on Newy-West standard
errors with 12-month lags. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Vt = β0 + β1t+ β2ROEt−1 + β3V ROEt−1 + β4GOt−1 + β5V GOt−1 + β6OCt−1 + ǫt.
Panel A: Young Stocks
Intercept t ROEt−1 V ROEt−1 GOt−1 V GOt−1 OCt−1 Adj.R
2
0.012477 -0.000050** -0.298950*** 2.741446*** 0.007899 -0.037710* 0.4886
(1) No OCt−1 (1.06) (-2.48) (-3.03) (3.75) (0.89) (-1.76)
0.021370** -0.000050*** -0.241370*** 2.850983*** 0.000417 -0.034700* 0.003561*** 0.5437
(2) OCt−1=SENT
⊥
t−1 (2.11) (-3.14) (-2.96) (4.85) (0.05) (-1.69) (3.20)
-0.005340 -0.000100*** -0.101520* 1.367447*** 0.012968** -0.021800 0.016123*** 0.6146
(3) OCt−1=TOt−1 (-0.68) (-5.23) (-1.70) (4.65) (2.12) (-1.44) (5.13)
0.016166 -0.000050*** -0.254520*** 1.250262*** -0.000630 -0.024660 0.035202*** 0.5797
(4) OCt−1=MISVt−1 (1.49) (-3.04) (-3.69) (2.97) (-0.07) (-1.28) (4.40)
Panel B: Old Stocks
Intercept t ROEt−1 V ROEt−1 GOt−1 V GOt−1 OCt−1 Adj.R
2
-0.046970*** -0.000007 -0.068540 -0.323580 0.040592*** 0.010758 0.4032
(1) No OCt−1 (-2.61) (-0.77) (-1.09) (-0.38) (2.76) (0.38)
-0.043100*** -0.000020** -0.034810 0.781023 0.036796*** 0.013149 0.001457*** 0.4847
(2) OCt−1=SENT
⊥
t−1 (-3.06) (-2.09) (-0.66) (0.88) (3.17) (0.48) (4.37)
-0.054470*** -0.000030*** -0.023460 0.128962 0.043436*** -0.016210 0.010038*** 0.4735
(3) OCt−1=TOt−1 (-3.29) (-2.96) (-0.51) (0.18) (3.38) (-0.56) (3.26)
-0.019280 -0.000010 -0.025210 -0.375930 0.017373 0.018719 0.010780*** 0.4444
(4) OCt−1=MISVt−1 (-1.24) (-1.25) (-0.44) (-0.48) (1.38) (0.70) (3.00)
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Table IX: Time-Series Subsample Tests based on Exchange Market
For each month, stocks are divided into NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ stocks, based on where they are listed. Within each group,
the monthly value-weighted idiosyncratic risk, Vt, is regressed on a time trend measure t, profitability, growth option, and the
overconfidence measures. ROEt is the value-weighted return on equity in month t. GOt is the value-weighted measure of the long-
term growth option. SENT⊥t is the investor sentiment index taken from Jeffrey Wurgler’s homepage. TOt is the value-weighted
stock turnover. MISVt measures misvaluation. The time-series variances of individual stocks’ return on equity and long-term
growth option over the previous 36 months are calculated and value weighted to get V ROEt and V GOt, respectively. Data cover
the period 01/1976-12/2005. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios based on Newy-West standard errors with 12-month lags.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Vt = β0 + β1t+ β2ROEt−1 + β3V ROEt−1 + β4GOt−1 + β5V GOt−1 + β6OCt−1 + ǫt.
Panel A: NYSE/AMEX Stocks
Intercept t ROEt−1 V ROEt−1 GOt−1 V GOt−1 OCt−1 Adj.R
2
-0.036740*** -0.000010 -1.140000 -1.809930* 0.030196*** 0.267700*** 0.4356
(1) No OCt−1 (-2.90) (-1.14) (-0.13) (-1.83) (2.97) (6.39)
-0.037490*** -0.000020* -0.012740 -0.539580 0.031223*** 0.214331*** 0.000933*** 0.4639
(2) OCt−1=SENT
⊥
t−1 (-3.37) (-1.83) (-0.22) (-0.53) (3.37) (4.53) (3.18)
-0.052970*** -0.000030*** 0.015068 -1.220390 0.040285*** 0.210933*** 0.009934*** 0.4949
(3) OCt−1=TOt−1 (-4.45) (-3.68) (0.35) (-1.42) (4.44) (6.25) (5.00)
-0.023280** -0.000010 0.006988 -1.970380** 0.019232** 0.235507*** 0.006066* 0.4438
(4) OCt−1=MISVt−1 (-1.98) (-1.07) (0.12) (-1.96) (2.00) (5.06) (1.76)
Panel B: NASDAQ Stocks
Intercept t ROEt−1 V ROEt−1 GOt−1 V GOt−1 OCt−1 Adj.R
2
-0.004140 -0.000040 -0.122380 3.014911* 0.010391 0.004154 0.2571
(1) No OCt−1 (-0.56) (-1.61) (-1.18) (1.78) (1.33) (0.42)
-0.001590 -0.000030 -0.103980 3.040855** 0.008385 0.002311 0.001947 0.2783
(2) OCt−1=SENT
⊥
t−1 (-0.25) (-1.47) (-1.01) (1.96) (1.08) (0.26) (1.27)
0.007514 -0.000130*** -0.002000 1.907097** 0.001456 0.010084 0.015360*** 0.4521
(3) OCt−1=TOt−1 (1.54) (-5.99) (-0.03) (2.22) (0.30) (1.53) (5.94)
0.011896** -0.000070*** 0.006372 2.221018*** -0.006520 0.013724** 0.033591*** 0.5048
(4) OCt−1=MISVt−1 (2.41) (-4.56) (0.07) (2.84) (-1.14) (2.00) (6.03)
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